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Abstract
We review the dynamical approach to spacetime theories—in par-
ticular, (a) its origins in the development of special relativity, (b) its
opposition to the contemporary ‘geometrical’ approach, and (c) the
manner in which it plays out in general relativity. In addition, we
demonstrate that the approach is compatible with the ‘angle bracket
school’.
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1 Introduction
In 1940, Einstein offered the following nutshell account of his special theory
of relativity (SR):1
The content of the restricted relativity theory can ... be sum-
marised in one sentence: all natural laws must be so conditioned
that they are covariant with respect to Lorentz transformations.
[17, p. 329]
This innocuous-sounding statement actually represents on Einstein’s part
a significant departure from his 1905 ‘principle theory’ approach to SR,
based upon the relativity principle, the light postulate, and the isotropy of
space. The shift in his thinking did not come about overnight. He had been
disconcerted for many years by both the limitations of the thermodynamic
template he had used in 1905 with its appeal to phenomenological principles,
and the inordinate emphasis he had placed on the role of light—and therefore
electromagnetism—in his theory.2
The so-called ‘dynamical’ approach to spacetime theories can be con-
sidered a development of Einstein’s 1940 characterisation of SR, and an
attempt to extend it both to general relativity (GR), and to a broader con-
text of spacetime theories. We defer the details until later in this paper,
but note in the meantime a feature of the 1940 statement common to the
1905 treatment: the absence of reference to the ‘geometry of spacetime’, and
emphasis on the (non-gravitational) laws of nature.
The seeds of this dynamical approach were sown in the late 19th cen-
tury by the great ether theorists G. F. FitzGerald, Hendrik Antoon Lorentz,
Joseph Larmor, and Henri Poincare´. The earliest post-1905 articulations can
be found in the writings of such luminaries as Hermann Weyl, Arthur Ed-
dington, and Wolfgang Pauli, and it is not unreasonable to put Einstein
himself into the mix. Later proponents included William F. G. Swann, La-
jos Ja´nossy, John S. Bell and Dennis Dieks.3 Notable recent articulations
1If a dynamical equation retains the same form in either of two coordinate systems
under consideration, then in this paper we say that it is invariant under the coordinate
change relating those systems. This differs from both Einstein and [8], where the term
covariant is used. The terminology of this paper is in line with [43]. In addition, where
Einstein spoke of Lorentz covariance (for us: Lorentz invariance), we often speak in this
paper of the broader notion of Poincare´ invariance, for reasons which will become clear
in §5.
2Einstein also had a bad conscience about the “sin” of treating ideal rods and clocks as
primitive entities in his 1905 formulation. For discussion of these misgivings, see [8, §7.1].
3For details concerning all these historical claims, see [8, chs. 4, 7].
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within the physics literature are due to D. J. Miller and William N. Nel-
son.4 In the last few decades, the approach has come to life within the
philosophy of physics as a reaction to aspects of the ‘angle bracket school’
of spacetime theories, first prominently exposed in the philosophical litera-
ture of the 1970s and especially the 1980s.5 The central role of geometry
in the treatment of pre-general relativistic theories in this approach has led
some philosophers to the view that special relativistic effects such as length
contraction and time dilation are ultimately explained by recourse to the
geometric structure of Minkowski spacetime, and that all such explanations
prior to the 1908 work of Minkowski are either misguided or incomplete.
Such a view still has weighty defenders, as the paper by Maudlin in this
volume attests. Defenders of the dynamical approach take issue with this
view.
A review of this size cannot do justice to recent criticisms of the dy-
namical approach, but at least its conceptual grounding can be laid out. To
this end, we begin with Maxwell’s 1865 theory of electrodynamics: the first
special relativistic theory in the history of physics.
2 Maxwell’s electrodynamics
In saying that Maxwell’s electrodynamics is (special) relativistic, we are re-
ferring to the standard field equations, possibly with source terms, but not
in combination with the original (non-relativistic) Lorentz force law.6 De-
spite this theory’s unique role as the historical cradle of SR, the latter theory
transcends it, as Einstein would insist in his mature years. SR amounts to
a specific constraint on all the non-gravitational interactions, not just the
electromagnetic, and it transcends the exact form of the equations of these
interactions when written in inertial coordinate systems. What SR demands
is simply that the equations governing all these interactions be Poincare´
invariant. It is satisfaction of this condition that makes Maxwell’s field
equations special relativistic.7
4See [32, 34, 35].
5See in particular Michael Friedman’s classic [18]. Note, however, that debates over the
primacy of coordinate-independent approaches in the foundations of spacetime theories
should in general be divorced conceptually from debates regarding the dynamical approach
to spacetime—see §3.3.
6Strictly speaking, we are referring here to the formulation of the theory in terms of the
3-vector formalism later developed by Heaviside and Hertz. It is only with the 4-tensor
formulation of Minkowski that the theory becomes manifestly Poincare´ invariant.
7In [8, pp. 146-147], this condition is referred to as the big principle.
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Looking forward to GR, Maxwell’s name reappears in the context of the
Einstein-Maxwell field equations. It is often thought that the fragment of
these equations related to the electromagnetic field is ‘locally’ equivalent to
the original nineteenth century theory. Although this is not entirely true for
several reasons, this (more fundamental) general relativistic fragment is still
locally Poincare´ invariant.8 We shall return in §4 to discuss further such local
dynamical equations. In the meantime, we wish to counter what we see as
two common confusions concerning the Maxwell theory as understood prior
to Einstein’s revolution, as a warm-up to defending the dynamical approach
to spacetime theories.
(i) The first is that the theory is incomplete. The theory, the argument
goes, does not specify explicitly the spacetime structure required for the
very definition of the technical terms it employs. As John Earman affirmed
in 1989, “...laws of motion cannot be written on thin air alone but require
the support of various space-time structures” [15, p. 46]. At first sight,
this claim should strike one as puzzling. What physical effect do Maxwell’s
equations, in say 3-vector form, fail to predict, or leave ambiguous, that
more explicit versions might not? None, if one bears in mind that in the
nineteenth century inertial frames were taken to be global. (More on this
later.) Recall John S. Bell’s perceptive remark in his 1976 essay How to
teach special relativity, that “the laws of physics in any one reference frame
account for all physical phenomena, including the observations of moving
observers” [4, p. 77].
It turns out that defenders of the incompleteness claim are likely, in our
experience, to be those brought up in what is sometimes called the ‘angle
bracket school’, according to which a spacetime theory first specifies a triple
structure 〈M,A,D〉 (no pun intended!), where M is the space-time mani-
fold, A is a placeholder for ‘fixed’ geometric-object fields characterising fixed
spacetime structure (if any),9 and D represents ‘dynamical’ geometric-object
fields. The theory then has the job of specifying which of the kinematically
possible models (KPMs) built out of this structure are dynamically allowed
(i.e., are dynamically possible models (DPMs)), the elements of A being
unchanged in each kinematically (a fortiori dynamically) allowed model of
the theory. Certainly, this geometrical approach has a number of merits, not
the least of which is allowing for successive theories from Galileo to Newton
8See [43].
9In light of subtleties regarding the notion of an ‘absolute object’, and the question of
whether GR itself has such objects (see [37]), in this paper we follow the nomenclature of
[40] in referring to the objects picked out by A as ‘fixed fields’.
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to Maxwell to Einstein (SR and GR) to be formulated in a common for-
mal language.10 (In the case of GR, there are no fixed fields A in the usual
sense, and D stands for the metric field together with the energy-momentum
tensor(s) associated with matter fields, if any.)
This unified language typically involves dynamical equations that are
generally covariant—i.e., which are form-invariant under arbitrary coordi-
nate transformations.11 The traditional Maxwell equations (even in the form
provided by Minkowski) are not. Is this a defect? Here opinions are bound
to differ. We see nothing intrinsically superior about general covariance;
the key issue is which coordinate systems most simplify the form of the
equations of the relevant dynamical theory.12 In the language of Friedman
[18, p. 60], in which coordinates is the “standard formulation” of the the-
ory obtained? In the case of Maxwell theory, it is the inertial coordinates
in which the Poincare´-Einstein synchrony convention is adopted, related
by Poincare´ transformations. The argument for general covariance which
rests on the claim that coordinate systems are mere labels of space-time
events, and that theories should be expressed in a label-general way, strikes
us as na¨ıve. How is it in SR, as understood by Einstein in 1905, that the
Lorentz transformations—supposedly mere changes of labels—can encode
the physical phenomena of length contraction and time dilation? (For fur-
ther discussion of these matters, see a recent, enlightening study of the role
of coordinate systems in physics by David Wallace [47], and §5 below.)
(ii) The second and related confusion about Maxwell’s electrodynamics is
that, prior to Einstein, the theory must be thought of as being defined in
pre-relativistic spacetime. By this, we mean that at the very least, inertial
coordinate transformations involving boosts are Galilean, not Lorentzian.
Let’s return again to Bell’s 1976 essay, and its dynamical analysis of a
hydrogen-like atom. Bell showed that if one chooses an inertial frame in-
volving the Poincare´-Einstein convention, so that Maxwell’s equations take
their familiar form therein, the predictions concerning the shape and period
10This is achieved in unprecedented detail in [18]; see also [15, 30].
11In light of footnote 1, it would be preferable to refer to this property as general
invariance; this we do not do for historical reasons. The observation that any spacetime
theory can be written in a generally covariant form was made to Einstein by Kretschmann
in 1917 [27].
12In [6], the desideratum of general covariance in formulating theories like Maxwell’s
electrodynamics is compared with the desideratum of formulating globally gauge-invariant
quantum dynamics in locally gauge invariant terms, when external fields (curvature) are
absent. Earman [15, ch. 3, §§4-5] also warns that the ‘fiddling’ involved in expressing
equations of motion in generally covariant form can lead to misunderstandings if the full
significance of the original equations is not taken into account.
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of an inertially moving atom obtained by solving the equations in this frame
will be consistent with those obtained by Lorentz transforming to the rest
frame of the atom and using the standard form of Maxwell’s equations in
that frame. Admittedly, Bell’s analysis used, over and above the Maxwell
field equations, relativistic dynamics of the kind that features in the rela-
tivistic version of the Lorentz force law. But Galilean transformations, if
they have anything like the operational significance we attribute to them
today, are not easy to reconcile with Maxwell’s field equations.
Here is another way to make this point. Consider the simple light- or
Langevin-clock: two separated mirrors mounted in parallel on, and perpen-
dicular to, a rigid straight rod. A pulse of light traveling parallel to the rod
bounces back and forth between the mirrors. When at rest in the frame
relative to which Maxwell’s equations are valid, the period of the clock is
approximately 2L/c where L is the distance between the mirrors, assumed
to be large compared to the pulse width, and c is the light speed as measured
in that frame. Maxwell’s equations predict that c is constant, i.e. indepen-
dent of the speed of the source and isotropic. It follows that if the Langevin
clock is now boosted into a new state of inertial motion with speed v relative
to the original frame, and in the direction of the principal axis of the rod,
the period becomes (as calculated by the observer in the original ‘resting’
frame) 2γ2L/c, where γ is the familiar Lorentz factor
(
1− v2/c2)−1/2. It
is assumed that the length of the rod is not affected by the boost, again
as determined by the resting observer. Assuming more generally that the
Galilean transformations hold, and have the standard operational meaning,
it also follows that there can be no time dilation associated with moving
clocks. When applied to the Langevin clock, this constraint implies that
the proper period of the moving Langevin clock does not coincide with that
in its resting state.13 But note that, as Einstein himself stressed,14 it is
a fundamental condition for the very possibility of kinematics such as ex-
emplified by the Galilean transformations, that ideal clocks are boostable,
meaning that as long as the forces producing the boosts are weak enough,
the proper periods of such clocks in their equilibrium states are invariant un-
der the boosts. So the Langevin clock is a counterexample to this principle,
and this conclusion should also shake our faith in the notion that Maxwell’s
equations can be combined with Galilean kinematics.
Such considerations are, however, entirely absent in attempts within the
angle bracket school to formulate a generally covariant version of ‘classical’
13See [8, p. 44].
14See [16] and [8, pp. 30, 81].
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Maxwellian electrodynamics within a space-time structure which purports
to be consistent with the Galilean law of the transformation of velocities—
attempts to provide a rigorous systematisation of presumably what Maxwell
himself thought was going on.15 Of course it is acknowledged that such
theories are hard to reconcile with the null results of ether wind experiments,
especially that of Michelson and Morley in 1887. But the issue here is not
whether classical electrodynamics is false; it is whether it is coherent. What
is lost sight of within the geometric intricacies of such attempts is the fact
that physical rulers and clocks are complicated dynamical objects subject
to the very non-gravitational interactions that are in play. In other words,
what is overlooked is the fact that the distinction between kinematics and
dynamics is not fundamental.16
Even the great Maxwell failed to see this. We expect undergraduates to
imbibe in their first course on relativity theory a profound insight largely
obscure to all the nineteenth century giants, including Maxwell, Lorentz,
Larmor and Poincare´: the physical meaning of inertial coordinate trans-
formations. It was Einstein in 1905 who was the first to understand the
physics of such transformations,17 and the fact they are neither a priori nor
conventional. This achievement in our view outstripped his treatment of
length contraction, time dilation and relativity of simultaneity—effects that
were, after all, already in the air at the turn of the century.18 Nor was this
achievement based on a temporary state of philosophical derangement on
Einstein’s part associated with crude operationalism. No wonder he was
unimpressed two decades later when Bohr and Heisenberg picked up what
they thought was the Einstein banner and applied crude operationalism in
their disturbance theory of indeterminacy in quantum theory.
3 Explanation
One of the most significant claims that the dynamical approach calls into
question has to do with the nature of the explanation of the so-called kine-
matical relativistic effects of length contraction and time dilation. No one, to
our knowledge, questions that these effects are a consequence of the Poincare´
15See [18, ch. III, §5].
16For a more detailed critique of ‘classical electrodynamics’, see [5]. Another notable
feature of the angle bracket school (at least on the part of some of its prominent advocates)
is the way in which the Newton-Einstein relativity principle is formulated. This has also
been the subject of criticism; the interested reader may consult [45, 6, 13], and [8, p. 36].
17Well, there was Keinstein in 1705, but that’s another story. See [8, ch. 3].
18See [8, ch. 4].
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invariance of the laws governing the non-gravitational interactions that are
responsible for the forces of cohesion within ‘rigid’ rulers and ‘ideal’ clocks.
The bone of contention is whether the buck stops there.
3.1 Symmetries, and the dynamical approach
Consider again a spacetime theory specifying a triple 〈M,A,D〉, with fixed
spacetime structure, and hence containing geometric-object fields associated
with the entry A. Following Earman [15, p. 45], a spacetime symmetry is
defined as a mapping from M onto itself that preserves (leaves invariant)
each element of A. In contrast, a dynamical symmetry is defined as a map-
ping from M onto itself such that if 〈M,A,D〉 is a dynamically allowed
model of the theory, then so is the model obtained by dragging along the
elements of D induced by the mapping.19 In the case of Minkowski space-
time, the spacetime symmetries are the isometries of the Minkowski metric;
the dynamical symmetries are related to the Poincare´ group of coordinate
transformations which preserve the form of the equations of motion when
written in inertial coordinates.20
In his famous discussion in 1989, Earman claimed that that every space-
time symmetry is a dynamical symmetry, and vice versa [15, ch. 3, §4]. He
stressed that this double requirement is not a matter of definition, but rep-
resents “adequacy conditions” for the theory in question to be “well-tuned”.
Now it is well-known that Newtonian mechanics set in ‘Newtonian’ space-
time has dynamical symmetries that are not spacetime symmetries. Earman
argued that Newtonian spacetime should be replaced by ‘neo-Newtonian’
(sometimes: ‘Galilean’) spacetime, essentially on the grounds of Occam’s ra-
zor: the former has absolute structure which is in an important sense idle.
19Earman defines both spacetime and dynamical symmetries in terms of diffeomor-
phisms; this restriction excludes discrete symmetries associated with time reversal and
space reflection (parity). In our view, it is not clear on what grounds symmetries involv-
ing discrete rather than continuous (Lie) groups are so excluded. Cf. §3.2.
20Note that, if the notion of spacetime symmetries is cashed out in terms of the transfor-
mation properties of fixed fields A, then the above analysis cannot be applied to e.g. GR,
or the alternative formulation of SR presented at [40, p. 120], for such theories feature
no fixed fields. A change of nomenclature broadly suffices to solve this difficulty—see [39,
§3.1], according to which ‘spacetime symmetry groups’ are “groups of transformations
that preserve spatiotemporal structure”, and a ‘dynamical symmetry group’ “is a group
that preserves the form of the equations that express the dynamical laws.” Note, how-
ever, that this particular choice of nomenclature presupposes that the geometrical objects
associated with ‘spacetime’ may be picked out from the triple structure associated with
a given theory; such an assumption is questionable on the dynamical approach (see [8,
ch. 9]).
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As for whether a spacetime symmetry may not be a dynamical symmetry,
Earman found it hard to envisage such a possibility.
There is a sense in which the advocate of the dynamical approach can
agree with this latter verdict of Earman. However, there is also a sense in
which, for the advocate of the dynamical approach, the former scenario—
viz., cases in which dynamical symmetries outstrip spacetime symmetries—
is equally difficult to envisage. The reason for this is that, as discussed
elegantly by Myrvold in a recent paper [33], the advocate of the dynamical
approach regards the coincidence of spacetime and dynamical symmetries
not merely as an “adequacy condition” on a given theory, but rather indeed
as holding analytically, “in virtue of considerations of meaning” [33, p. 7]. By
proceeding in this manner, any mystery regarding how spacetime structure
is supposed to ‘explain’ the dynamics of matter is dissolved.
Myrvold tells us that spacetime structure just is that fixed structure A
the spacetime symmetries of which coincide with the dynamical symmetries
of the theory in question. Though we broadly concur with this presentation,
it is possible that Myrvold’s account might give the impression that the
advocate of the dynamical approach is interested principally in conceptual
analysis—spacetime symmetries just are dynamical symmetries; spacetime
structure (ultimately reducible to symmetries of dynamical laws) just is
that structure which manifests those symmetries.21 It is important to note,
however, that advocates of the dynamical approach may resist being thus
tarred with the analytical brush. Rather, the principal aim of this approach
is to account for the chronogeometricity of metric structure—that is, to
answer the question of why that structure is surveyed by rods and clocks
built out of matter fields; this is achieved by stating that the metric field
in such theories is reducible to dynamical symmetries. There is a sense in
which the term ‘spacetime’ is redundant to this goal; we anticipate that
some advocates of the dynamical approach would be happy to excise it.22
3.2 The geometrical approach
Having sketched some key aspects of the dynamical view, let us turn now
to a diametrically opposite approach. It is sometimes argued that the sym-
metries of Minkowski spacetime explain the fact that the dynamical laws
21Cf. [26, p. 2].
22When viewed in this manner, the spacetime functionalism of Knox can be understood
as augmenting the dynamical approach, essentially with the functionalist criterion that
‘spacetime’ should be identified with whatever structure in a given theory has chronogeo-
metric significance. For more on Knox’s approach, see [24, 25, 26].
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are Poincare´ invariant. Such a view is implicit in Friedman’s 1983 book.23
Though not himself not an advocate of the angle bracket school generally,
Michel Janssen wrote similarly in 2002:
In Minkowski spacetime, the spatio-temporal coordinates of dif-
ferent observers are related by Lorentz transformations rather
than Galilean transformations. Any laws for systems in Minkowski
spacetime must accordingly be Lorentz invariant. [22, p. 499]
More recently, Tim Maudlin has likewise stated:
... the Minkowski geometry takes exactly the same form de-
scribed in [any] Lorentz coordinate system (by the symmetry of
Minkowski spacetime), and the laws of physics take exactly the
same coordinate-based form when stated in a coordinate-based
language in any Lorentz coordinate system (because the laws
can only advert to the Minkowski geometry, and it has the same
coordinate-based description). [31, pp. 117-118]
Readers may recall Bell’s 1976 discussion of a string connecting two rockets
undergoing identical accelerations. Maudlin argues that the length contrac-
tion responsible for the eventual breaking of the string can be traced to three
circumstances:
... the geometrical symmetries in Minkowski spacetime, the ne-
cessity of specifying dynamical laws in terms of the Minkowski
structure, and the physical constitution that makes the thread a
rigid body ... [31, p. 119]
It is somewhat ironic that Bell was able (as Einstein would have been in
1905, but with different emphasis) to explain the string breaking effect with-
out ever referring to Minkowski spacetime; indeed one of the aims of Bell’s
increasingly well-known paper was to warn against “premature philosophis-
ing about space and time” [4, p. 80] when teaching special relativity. Was
he misguided?
Fixed geometric structures in physics are not limited to spacetime. Con-
sider, for example, the Lobachevskian geometry of the velocity space in
special relativity that is associated with the non-commutativity of (non-
aligned) boosts and hence the Thomas precession effect, or the curved met-
ric of the projective Hilbert space in quantum mechanics associated with
23See e.g. [18, ch. VI, §4].
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the phenomenon of geometric phase.24 These different geometric structures
(discovered after the physical effects to which they are associated) are rather
elegant mathematical representations of aspects of the physics of boosts and
of Schro¨dinger evolution, respectively, but arguably do not constitute an ex-
planation of these effects. Why should it be any different in the case of
absolute spacetime geometry?
Then there is the question of how the explanation suggested by Janssen,
Maudlin, and others, is supposed to work. Does Minkowski spacetime some-
how ‘act’ on the dynamical geometric-object fields? Friedman made it clear
in 1983 that Minkowski spacetime is in his view a real physical entity.25
Is it then capable of action? It is certainly not capable of reaction, be-
cause it is a fixed structure. If it acts in some causal way, it is a curi-
ous business: no terms relating to the action appear in the dynamical laws
when expressed in their standard configuration.26 (Hence the possibility of
a relativistic theory—Maxwell’s electrodynamics—appearing decades before
spacetime was a glint in either Poincare´’s or, more importantly, Minkowski’s
eyes.) The use of vague expressions like the necessity of laws to ‘advert’ to
the Minkowski geometry does little to dispel the mystery.
By way of development on this point, consider the standard model of
particle physics (following [13, p. 256]). In this model, the strong and elec-
tromagnetic force are known to conserve parity (i.e. the associated laws are
invariant under the discrete symmetry of spatial reflections); not so for the
weak force, which violates parity and time-reversal invariance. In order to
‘explain’ weak force dynamical laws, advocates of the geometrical approach
presumably must introduce extra spacetime structure, over and above the
Minkowski metric, in order to ensure that spacetime and dynamical sym-
metries in the sense of Earman align.27 The extra structure involved in the
case of the weak interactions would be a continuous choice throughout the
manifold M determining which half of the null cone represents the future,
24For more details, see [8, pp. 134-136].
25See [18, ch. VI, §4]. Note, however, that Janssen does not embrace such a claim, speak-
ing instead of a ‘common origin inference’ to Minkowski spacetime structure, understood
as universal Lorentz invariance construed as a kinematical constraint. See e.g. [22, 23],
and discussion below.
26It is worth noting that a few years after proposing his gravitational field equations,
Einstein criticized both Newtonian mechanics and SR for violating the action-reaction
principle, because the relevant spacetime structures in both cases allegedly determined
the inertial motion of free bodies. We return to the issue of inertia below. For a recent
critical discussion of Einstein’s stance and its timing, see [9].
27At least, if such discrete symmetries are also subject to Earman’s “adequacy
conditions”—cf. footnote 19.
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and an antisymmetric tensor field which similarly provides a continuous
choice of ‘right handed’ versus ‘left handed’ orthonormal triads of spacelike
vectors at each point in M .28 But, having introduced this structure, the
question arises: why does the strong force, for instance, not also ‘advert’ to
this spacetime structure? Some further nuancing of the notion of geometric
explanation is surely needed here.29
Another awkwardness in the geometric approach is exposed in the case
of the de Broglie-Bohm hidden-variable quantum theory. In its relativistic
treatment of quantum fields, the equation governing the quantum degrees of
freedom is Poincare´ invariant; however, the guidance equation governing the
sub-quantum degrees of freedom is Galilean invariant, and in general involves
instantaneous action-at-a-distance. From the geometric perspective it seems
that the theory invokes two distinct spacetime structures—Minkowski and
Galilean30—though the latter is ‘hidden’.31 It is unclear how the geometric
explanation of dynamical symmetries is supposed to work in this case.32 To
reject the theory on the grounds that its spacetime structure is ambiguous,
or degenerate, would surely be too high-handed!
It is well-known that Newton attributed no powers of action to absolute
space, not even to constrain the inertial motion of force-free bodies. It is
noteworthy that in attempting to account for the universality of Poincare´
invariance in terms of Minkowski spacetime, Janssen accepted in 2009 that
this geometric structure has no existence independent of the matter fields
subject to the dynamical laws of interest, so its action is not causal [23, p. 28].
Janssen gives a number of overlapping accounts as to what it is, one being
28See [46, p. 60] and [20]. Note that it is not just the weak interactions that seem to call
for this augmented Minkowski spacetime. In local relativistic QFT, it is a theorem that
for systems of identical particles confined to two spatial dimensions, if either spatial reflec-
tion in a line or time reversal is a symmetry of the theory in all its superselection sectors,
then the quantum statistics are associated with the ordinary permutation group, i.e. ei-
ther Bose-Einstein or Femi-Dirac. See [19, p. 56]. However, remarkably, the possibility of
‘fractional’ or ‘braid’ statistics ranging between Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac is known
to be self-consistent in the case of two-dimensional confinement, in a way that it is not
when electrons explore three dimensions. See [29]. This phenomenon is not a mere theo-
retical nicety—it is apparently displayed in two-dimensional electron gases in a transversal
external magnetic field exhibiting the fractional quantum Hall effect (see e.g. [41]). Space
reflections and time reversal are not symmetries of such electron gases [19, p. 56]. Certain
systems exhibiting the fractional quantum Hall effect are being investigated with a view
to application in quantum computation.
29For further recent discussion on this point, see [42].
30See e.g. [30, ch. 4] for technical details.
31For further details see [36] and [44].
32For related comments, see [33].
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a kind of nomic necessity inspired by Marc Lange’s analysis of ‘meta-laws’
in physics [28]. Rather, however, than pursue this line of thinking, we wish
to make two points. The first is that there is nothing in Minkowski’s own
writings suggesting that he was providing an explanation for the universal
nature of the Poincare´ group; on the contrary, it was the latter on which he
based his geometrical insights.33 Second, the dynamical approach outlined
in §3.1 constitutes a straightforward means of resolving these mysteries.
3.3 The dynamical approach, reprise
It should be clear that the dynamical approach to spacetime theories is to
be set in contrast with the above geometrical account. One further aspect
of the dynamical approach is now worth emphasising: in the context of SR,
Poincare´ invariance of the dynamical laws is, on this view, to be understood
as a brute fact : no ‘explanation’ of such a result via appeal to spacetime
structure is mandated; nor is it clear how such an account could proceed.
In a theory in which all dynamical equations for non-gravitational fields
manifest the same symmetries—again, such as SR—spacetime structure may
be viewed as a codification of such symmetries.
Having thus presented the dynamical approach, it is worth dispelling
one possible source of confusion. While the geometrical approach is often
endorsed by members of the angle bracket school (such as Friedman [18,
ch. IV]), and advocates of the dynamical approach (such as ourselves) often
do not view as illegitimate the issuing of coordinate-dependent presenta-
tions of physical theories (cf. §2), the debate between coordinate-dependent
versus -independent presentations should be considered orthogonal to the
debate between the geometrical and dynamical approaches. This can be
illustrated through two points: on the one hand, authors such as Janssen
can be viewed as embracing (a certain version of) the geometrical approach
alongside coordinate-dependent presentations; on the other, we shall see in
§5 that there may be some advantages to viewing the dynamical account
through the lens of coordinate-independent approaches to spacetime theo-
ries.
4 General relativity
In the context of theories with non-dynamical metric fields such as SR,
one crucial aspect of the debate between the dynamical and geometrical
33See [8, ch. 8].
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perspectives may be put straightforwardly: for the advocate of the former,
the metric field (in the case of SR, the Minkowski metric field) need not
be regarded as an ontologically distinct and primitive entity; rather, it is
a codification of certain brute facts about the dynamical laws governing
matter fields (namely, facts about their symmetries). By contrast, for certain
advocates of the latter,34 the metric field in such theories is an ontologically
distinct and primitive entity, its presence explaining certain facts about
the dynamical laws governing matter fields (namely, the fact that they all
manifest certain symmetries).
This situation changes in important ways on moving to theories with dy-
namical metric fields, such as GR. Since in such cases the metric field comes
equipped with its own associated field equations (in the context of GR, the
Einstein field equations), this field is not straightforwardly ontologically re-
ducible to the matter fields, as per the dynamical approach in the context of
spacetime theories with non-dynamical metric fields.35 Indeed, advocates of
both the dynamical and geometrical perspectives in the context of theories
with dynamical metric fields are in agreement on this point.
That said, there remain crucial differences between the two camps, in
particular regarding the chronogeometric significance of the metric field. On
the dynamical perspective, the dynamics of the metric field tell us that it is
‘just another field’: “Nothing in the form of the equations per se indicates
that [the metric field] is the metric of space-time, rather than a (0, 2) sym-
metric tensor which is assumed to be non-singular” [8, p. 160]. How, then,
does the metric field acquire its chronogeometric significance in GR? For the
proponent of the dynamical approach, the metric field “earns its spurs by
way of the strong equivalence principle” [8, p. 151]. That is to say, locally in
GR—assuming that one’s experimental apparata are sufficiently insensitive
that curvature effects may be ignored—not only does the metric field take
the form of the Minkowski metric field (i.e. is diagonalisable, and invariant
under Poincare´ transformations), but dynamical equations for matter fields
take a Poincare´ invariant form.36 As a consequence, rods and clocks built
out of matter fields locally survey the metric field.37
34Here we exclude Janssen—cf. footnote 25.
35To claim that the metric field is reducible to the matter fields in GR is to endorse
a certain form of relationism about the metric field; there are profound difficulties with
implementing this programme in GR. An obvious illustration of this difficulty can be found
in the existence of vacuum solutions in the theory.
36These are significant subtleties in this vicinity—see [43, §§3-4] for recent discussion.
37The above is posed in the context of GR, but if an equivalent form of the strong
equivalence principle is available in other spacetime theories with dynamical metric fields,
then the same analysis may go through.
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By contrast, advocates of the geometrical approach in the context of
spacetime theories with dynamical metric fields may maintain that the met-
ric field has a primitive connection to spacetime geometry—and that in the
local regime in which curvature effects may be ignored, the dynamical laws
governing matter fields are locally constrained to be invariant with respect
to the local symmetries of this field, in the same manner as for the geometri-
cal picture in the context of theories with non-dynamical metric fields, such
as SR.
4.1 Problem cases for the geometrical approach
In this section, we present what we take to be two problem cases for the
geometrical approach in the context of spacetime theories with dynamical
metric fields. To begin, consider the Jacobson-Mattingly theory (presented
in e.g. [14, 21]38), in which the action for a coupled Einstein-Maxwell system
is augmented with an additional term (via a Lagrange multiplier field λ),
imposing (as a field equation, via variation with respect to λ) that the vector
potential Aa be locally timelike:39
SJM [gab, A
a, λ] =
∫
d4x
√−g
(
R− 1
4
F abFab + λ
(
gabA
aAb − 1
))
. (1)
The imposition of this Lagrange multiplier term means that, in the
Jacobson-Mattingly theory, the dynamical behaviour of non-gravitational
fields does not reflect the local (Poincare´) symmetries of the metric field.
Given this, however, we appear to have in our possession a problem case for
the geometrical approach.
Turn now to our second case: Bekenstein’s bimetric TeVeS (‘Tensor-
Vector-Scalar’) theory, presented in [2, 3]. As discussed in [8, §9.5.2], in this
theory the metric field which is surveyed by rods and clocks, the conformal
structure of which is traced by light rays, and the geodesics of which corre-
spond to the motion of free bodies, is not the ‘fundamental’ metric field gab,
but rather a less ‘fundamental’ metric field g˜ab, constructed from the other
matter fields in the theory [8, p. 174]. Indeed, the TeVeS theory presents
another case in which the local symmetries of the dynamical laws do not
38In fact, the version of the Jacobson-Mattingly theory discussed in this paper is a
special case of that presented in [14, 21].
39The first term is the Einstein-Hilbert action; Fab is the Faraday tensor associated to
Aa.
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mirror the local (Poincare´) symmetries of the ‘background’ metric field—a
necessary condition for the geometrical approach to go through.40
4.2 Two miracles
Seemingly, the advocate of the dynamical perspective in the context of GR
is committed to the existence of two unexplained input assumptions in the
foundations of the theory—recently dubbed the two ‘miracles of GR’ [43,
§5]:41
1. All non-gravitational interactions are locally governed by Poincare´ in-
variant dynamical laws.
2. The Poincare´ symmetries of the laws governing non-gravitational fields
in the neighbourhood of any point coincide—in the regime in which
curvature can be ignored—with the symmetries of the dynamical met-
ric field in that neighbourhood.
(1) holds in SR: it tells us that the dynamical laws governing all matter
fields are Poincare´ invariant; the advocate of the dynamical approach takes
this to be a brute fact; the advocate of the geometrical alternative attempts
to rationalise this by appeal to Minkowski spacetime. (1) still obtains in the
neighbourhood of any point in the spacetime manifold in GR.42 However,
in the case of GR there also exists an ontologically autonomous metric field,
and this leads to (2): why is it—assuming that curvature terms can be ig-
nored (which, to repeat, depends upon the sensitivity of one’s experimental
apparata relative to the strength of curvature effects in the neighbourhood
of that apparata)—that the symmetries of the dynamical laws governing
non-gravitational fields in a suitable neighbourhood of any p ∈ M coincide
with those of the dynamical metric field in that neighbourhood? Again,
the advocate of the dynamical approach may postulate this as a brute fact.
By contrast, the advocate of the geometrical approach may attempt to ar-
gue that the ontologically primitive metric field explains the form of the
dynamical laws governing matter fields; however, as in SR, she faces an
outstanding burden to delineate how this is supposed to work. For further
discussion regarding these ‘miracles of GR’, see [43, §5].
40For further detailed discussion of bimetric theories in defence of the dynamical ap-
proach, see [38]. Pitts also cites massive scalar gravity as a case in which “the chronogeo-
metrically observable ... metric isn’t clearly the One True Geometry” [38, §5].
41A similar ‘miracle’ in the context of Newtonian theory would be the proportionality
of gravitational and inertial masses—cf. [48].
42See [43, §3].
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5 Coordinate-independent approaches
Let us turn now in greater detail to a question raised in §3.3: to what extent
is the dynamical perspective reconcilable with the coordinate-independent,
‘angle brackets’ approach in the foundations of spacetime theories? Though
this question has been addressed to some extent in [39, §6.3.2] and [47, §6],
it is worth reflecting further on the matter. In this section, we first consider
theories with non-dynamical metric fields (§5.1), before turning to theories
with dynamical metric fields (§5.2).
5.1 Non-dynamical metric fields
Consider the theory of a massive Klein-Gordon field ϕ, as specified in the
coordinate-dependent approach via
ηµν∂
µ∂νϕ+mϕ = 0. (2)
In (2), ηµν denotes the components of a matrix diag (−1, 1, 1, 1). The choice
of coordinate basis used in the above is (partly) arbitrary: this is captured
in the fact that (2) is invariant under all Poincare´ transformations, i.e. coor-
dinate transformations of the form xµ → Λµνxµ+aµ, with ΛµνΛλσηµλ = ηνσ
and the aµ arbitrary constant vectors. As elaborated in detail by Wallace [47,
§§2-3], on the so-called Kleinian conception of geometry, dynamical equa-
tions such as (2) may be understood as defining certain spacetime structure,
via their transformation properties—so, for example, (2) defines a Minkowski
spacetime structure via the fact that it is invariant under Poincare´ trans-
formations.43 Clearly, this approach goes hand-in-hand with the dynamical
perspective—spacetime structure may be read off from the transformation
properties of the set of dynamical equations under consideration.44
43As Wallace states [47, p. 13], this approach is, in fact, also coordinate-independent—
for it does not rely on evaluations being made in any particular coordinate system. For
this reason, it may be preferable to call what in this paper we label the ‘coordinate-
independent approach’ by some other name (though, as Wallace points out, the natural
choice of ‘coordinate-free’ faces its own problems [47, p. 14]). For simplicity, however, we
avoid doing so; this note should suffice to ameliorate any confusion in this regard.
44As Wallace states, “This is not to say that Brown’s approach is compulsory in a
presentation of spacetime theories based on structure (pseudo-)groups [roughly, groups
of transformations which preserve dynamical equations in a given form]. I characterised
such theories as having structure groups tacitly determined by the equations of motion,
but it’s mathematically coherent to start with a structured space with group G and then
write down on that space a theory whose dynamical symmetry group is larger than G”
[47, p. 22]. We take it that this latter deployment of the Kleinian conception of geometry
would constitute a way of making sense of e.g. Janssen’s position.
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The above in mind, suppose now that one seeks to reconcile the dy-
namical perspective in the context of such theories with the coordinate-
independent approach. In the coordinate-independent picture, the theory
in question is expressed through the introduction of the fixed geometrical
object ηab—a Minkowski metric field fixed identically in all KPMs of the
theory; DPMs are then picked out by
ηab∇a∇bϕ+mϕ = 0. (3)
Since, however, this object is introduced in order to capture (in a coordinate-
independent way) that the form of (2) is preserved only under Poincare´
transformations,45 we may understand this object ηab to codify the symmetry
properties of (2)—this equation being understood to be fundamental, on the
dynamical approach.
In this way, we understand fixed metric fields such as ηab to be ontolog-
ically supervenient upon the (dynamics of) matter fields (in this case ϕ);
in doing so, we reconcile the coordinate-independent approach with the dy-
namical perspective. On this account, although the structure ηab appears
in the KPMs of the theory in question, it is not to be understood as on-
tologically autonomous. Of course, the picture of introducing KPMs then
DPMs remains highly unnatural on the dynamical view. Nevertheless, there
is nothing erroneous in introducing these classes of models post hoc, while
continuing to reconcile the primacy of coordinate-dependent dynamical laws
for matter fields.46
5.2 Dynamical metric fields
Consider a minimally-coupled,47 general relativistic theory of the massive
scalar field, analogous (as far as possible) to the special relativistic theory
presented above. In the coordinate-dependent approach, such a theory may
45Since ηab is a fixed field, performing an (active) diffeomorphism implementing an
arbitrary linear transformation on (3) yields ηabM
a
cM
b
d∇c∇dϕ + mϕ = 0, where Mac
is the associated (linear) transformation matrix—and this will only reduce to (3) when
ηabM
a
cM
b
d = ηcd, i.e. when the linear transformation is a Poincare´ transformation.
46Indeed, there exists a precedent in the angle brackets school of including non-
fundamental geometrical objects in the KPMs of a given theory, for convenience—consider
e.g. the inclusion of a derivative operator ∇a over and above a timelike vector field σa in
the KPMs of Newtonian mechanics set in Newtonian spacetime. Our thanks to Tushar
Menon for this point.
47For the definition of minimal coupling, as well as detailed philosophical discussion of
the procedure, see [12, §IV] and [43, §3].
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be specified through writing down the following two dynamical equations:48
Gµν = 8piTµν , (4)
gµν∇µ∇νϕ+mϕ = 0. (5)
Here, Gµν is the Einstein tensor associated to the metric field gµν ; Tµν is
the stress-energy tensor associated to ϕ. Since in this case the metric field is
dynamical, we have a theory for gµν and ϕ together.
49 The facts that (a) gµν
is locally diagonalisable to read diag (−1, 1, 1, 1); (b) locally and in a regime
in which curvature effects may be ignored (this depends crucially upon the
sensitivity of the experimental apparatus available relative to the strength of
curvature effects—see [43, §4]) gµν has higher derivatives vanishing; and (c)
in this regime (5) takes a Poincare´-invariant form, mean that gµν is locally
surveyed by rods and clocks built out of the ϕ field—thereby affording it its
chronogeometric significance.
On the coordinate-independent approach, one characterises this theory
as follows. First, KPMs are picked out by triples 〈M, gab, ϕ〉; then, DPMs are
those KPMs the geometrical objects of which obey the dynamical equations
Gab = 8piTab, (6)
gab∇a∇bϕ+mϕ = 0. (7)
So be it—but ask now how one would express the dynamical perspective
in coordinate-independent language in this case. Again, equations written
in a coordinate basis—here (4) and (5)—are to be considered primitive. In
this case, however, on moving to the coordinate-independent formalism, no
new geometrical objects are introduced.50 This makes clear an important
point already noted in §4: in this case, metric field structure is not merely
a codification of the symmetries of the given dynamical laws—rather, such
structure already exists in (4) and (5).
Thus, consideration of the coordinate-independent formalism arguably
illustrates a point in the context of spacetime theories such as GR to which
the advocate of the dynamical approach assents. Perhaps more importantly,
though, further merits of deploying this formalism emerge when one consid-
ers the local forms of (4) and (5). Considering (5) locally and in a regime in
48We set GN = c = 1.
49Cf. [40, p. 115].
50The reason for this is part of the special character of GR: (4) and (5) were generally
covariant (i.e. held in an arbitrary coordinate basis) to start off with.
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which curvature terms may be ignored, this equation takes a form invariant
under Poincare´ transformations.51 Thus, applying the Kleinian conception
of geometry to this new, local equation, one again extracts (in exactly the
same manner as in §5.1) Minkowski spacetime structure—and again, on the
dynamical approach, this structure can be understood as a codification of
the symmetry properties of that local dynamical law.
Locally, therefore, one might introduce a Minkowski metic field η˜ab to
codify the symmetries of this dynamical law. But note that the dynami-
cal gab field remains in this theory! Moreover, locally (and in a regime in
which curvature effects can be dropped), gab also resembles the Minkowski
metric field.52 The test of whether gab has local chronogeometric signifi-
cance, therefore, is precisely whether the dynamical metric field gab is lo-
cally isomorphic—in the appropriate regime in which curvature effects may
be ignored—to the metric field which codifies the symmetries of the dynam-
ical laws, η˜ab.
Putting things in this way—i.e. introducing a new geometrical object
taken to codify the symmetries of the original (non-gravitational) dynamical
laws—is deeply ingrained in the coordinate-independent approach; neverthe-
less, it makes perspicuous the tests of chronogeometric significance envisaged
by advocates of the dynamical approach in the cases in which the metric
field itself is a dynamical entity. We conclude, therefore, that not only is the
dynamical approach compatible with the coordinate-independent approach
in this context; but moreover, there may be some advantages to its use, from
the point of view of presenting the dynamical approach.53
Let us attempt to demonstrate this stronger claim via two auxiliary
points. First, consider again bimetric theories with two dynamical metric
fields. Using the above formalism, the metric field in these theories which
may lay claim to chronogeometric significance is precisely that which is
locally isomorphic to the metric field g˜ab which codifies the local symmetries
of the dynamical laws. Second, thinking in this manner constitutes a good
framework for consideration of scenarios in which there exists a misalignment
between metric field structure and symmetries of the dynamical laws—for
in such cases one may say that the dynamical metric field is not locally
isomorphic to the metric field which codifies the symmetries of the non-
51This is demonstrated in e.g. [43, §A].
52Cf. [43, §3].
53Again, on the dynamical approach it is unnatural to introduce a class of KPMs in
a coordinate-independent manner, then restrict to a certain class of DPMs based upon
the dynamical equations which the geometrical objects in the KPMs satisfy. Nevertheless,
there is nothing inconsistent with making use of this apparatus on the dynamical approach.
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gravitational laws.
6 Outlook
We have sketched the progression of the dynamical approach, from its ori-
gins in the development of SR, to its opposition to the contemporary ‘geo-
metrical’ approach, to the manner in which it plays out in GR. Moreover,
we have demonstrated that the perspective is not incompatible with certain
coordinate-independent approaches in the foundations of spacetime theories.
It is gratifying that work continues to be done in further developing the dy-
namical approach (see e.g. [24, 25, 26, 33, 38, 47, 49]); it is our hope that
its framework continues to offer insight to those working in the foundations
of spacetime theories in years to come.
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